Regie:
Toshio MasudaScenario:
笠原 和夫Muziek:
Naozumi YamamotoActeurs:
Tatsuya Nakadai, Toshirō Mifune, Toshiyuki Nagashima, Kayo Matsuo, 野際陽子, Tetsurô Tamba, 森繁久彌, 南廣, Kin'ya Aikawa, 稲葉義男, Masako Natsume, Hiroshi Kondô (meer)Recensie (2)
A war epic with a generous budget featuring beautiful exteriors, crowd scenes, and set in the unexplored cinematic landscape of a war conflict in the Far East. However, it suffers from several drawbacks, such as sentimentality, nationalism, and insufficient distance from the subject. The war, as portrayed by the director, is about heroism and dying in traditional samurai style, rather than about the brutality and tragedies that inevitably come with it. Overall impression: 50%.
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I have been interested in the Russo-Japanese War for a long time because it was the first modern war. At the same time, it was a clash between a traditional power and a new (but more aggressive) player in the fight for colonial dominance. Russia and Japan fought their war on Chinese and Korean territory, so it was a confrontation between aggressors, and the only surprising thing was the outcome. The film's creators approached the subject in a Japanese way, and even though they followed historical facts in rough outlines, they let themselves get carried away in detail. When they informed me that the Imperial Army did not have machine guns, my jaw dropped, and I left it hanging for a while when I saw the number of Russian machine guns per square meter. I understand that they wanted to emphasize the heroism of Japanese soldiers, but I think it was completely unnecessary. They needlessly pushed the situation repeatedly to absurdity when it would have been enough for them to stick to the bare facts. The battle on the Liao-tung Peninsula was essentially a meat grinder in which infantry on both sides suffered, with catastrophic Japanese casualties. It was a story about an impregnable fortress, which was a grave error because the Russians didn't make much effort in terms of fortification. At the time of the outbreak of the war, they were mostly forced to defend themselves from improvised positions. Another error was the information about the loss of dozens of cruisers; anyone with even basic knowledge about the Russian navy at that time knows what I'm talking about. As I said, I think such nonsense was absolutely unnecessary, and this precursor to what would happen in Europe in ten years deserved a more honest approach. / Lesson learned: Once you mount a tiger, you shouldn't get off.
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